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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a civil jlidgment in the amount
of $5,174.89 in favor of Plainti tf entered by the
Honorable David L. Mower, Tenth pircuit Court, Sevier
County, sitting without a jury,

Defendant appealed

said judgment pursuant to U.C.A. 78-4-11 and Rules 3
and 4 of the Rules of the Court

iv

f appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO SUSTAIN
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT, ELIZABETH DEWSNUP, IS
LIABLE FOR THE DEBT OWING TO RESPONDENT, WINKEL,
FOR GOODS DELIVERED TO THE VALLEY TWIN CINEMAS?

v

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent, Winkel Distributing, (hereinafter
referred to as Winkel) is a wholesale food and beverage
distributor in Richfield, Utah.

The Valley Twin Cinema is a

double movie theater which was constructed and began doing
business in Richfield, Utah, on or about 1982 (T. 64). Brad
Whittaker was the manager of the Valley Twin Cinemas from the
commencement of operations throughout all times relevant herein
(T. 64). When the Valley Twin Cinemas began doing business,
Mr. Whittaker opened an account with Winkel under the
designation of Modern Valley Twin Cinemas |and directed
Mr. Winkel to send statements to a Delta, Colorado address (T.
19).

The account was kept current initially, but became

delinquent in 1984 (T. 22). In the fall Q£ 1984, Kim Winkel,
owner and manager of Winkel Distributing, contacted Brad
Whittaker on several occasions to attempt to have the account
brought current.

Mr. Whittaker was unable to get the account

current and Winkel requested the name of the owner to contact
to collect on the account.

Mr. Whittaker informed him that the

Appellant, Elizabeth Dewsnup, hereinafter Mrs. Dewsnup, was the
individual to contact in order to get the account brought
current.

Mr. Whittaker provided a telephone number and Winkel
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thereafter contacted Elizabeth Dewsnup on two or three
occasions by telephone (T. 26). On each of these
conversations, Winkel informed Elizabeth Dewsnup that he was
calling regarding the Valley Twin Cinemas and their delinquent
account in the approximate sum of $4,000.00.

Mrs. Dewsnup on

each telephone conversation acknowledged the obligation,
apologized for the delinquency, claimed she was behind in her
bills, but she would try to get some money on the account
within the next few days.

At no time did Mrs. Dewsnup deny

liability for the account (T. 28, 29).
As a result of Mrs. Dewsnup promises to pay,
Winkel postponed taking action on the account and continued
permitting the theatre manager to charge for goods delivered
(T. 28). When payments on the account were not received as
provided, Winkel discontinued credit with the last charge being
in May, 1985.

After further demands for payment without

response, Mr. Winkel filed the present action.

At no time

prior to the filing of the action did Appellant, Mrs. Dewsnup,
or her manager, Brad Whittaker, claim that liability for the
account rested with a Colorado corporation.

To the contrary,

both Dewsnup and Whittaker repeatedly acknowledged liability on
the account and promised payment.

As noted in the copies of

the invoices attached as a addendum to Appellant!s brief, the
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account originated in the name of Valley Twin Cinemas and was
therefore referred to a Modern Twin Cinemas, Modern Cinema,
Twin Cinema, Valley Cinemas and Cinema Twins.

No where in any

of the accounts, deposit slips or other accountings is there
any evidence of a corporate existence.
As previously noted, Brad Wtkittaker was the
manager of the Valley Twin Cinemas from tljieir opening until
December of 1985 when he purchased the saijie from Appellant,
Elizabeth Dewsnup (T. 63, 64). Mr. Whittaker testified at
trial that when he was approached by Winkdl regarding the
delinquent account, he referred them to Mifs. Dewsnup (T. 65);
that if there were any problems regarding|the Twin Cinemas,
that he would contact Mrs. Dewsnup (T. 68), that Mrs. Dewsnup
had, in fact, paid property taxes on the Equipment prior to
June, 1985, (alleged take over date), (T, 70, 71). Mr. Whittaker
testified that he was operating not only tihe Valley Twin
Cinemas, but also the Huish Theatre in Ricihfield during 1984
and that he received pay checks for managing both theatres from
Elizabeth Dewsnup under her dba Citi Cinemas (T. 72, 73), that
candy and gum and so forth were purchased jointly for both
theatres and payment alternated between thie theatres (T. 73)
In the fall of 1984, Mr. Whittaker testifi ed that he received
new deposit slips and that all proceeds from the Valley Twin
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Theatres were deposited directly in an account with the heading
of Citi Cinema, the dba for Elizabeth Dewsnup (T. 80); that
Mr. Whittaker did not have authority to withdraw money from the
account and that all pay checks during this period were signed
by Elizabeth Dewsnup (T. 81, 82).
When called to testify, Appellant, Elizabeth
Dewsnup, acknowledged that she had picked up the payroll for
the Valley Twin Cinemas in exchange for favors from Modern
Cinema, with full knowledge that Modern Cinema was having
difficulty paying their bills (T. 91, 92). That her reason for
picking up the payroll was to keep the operation going until
she could take over (T. 94). Mrs. Dewsnup also acknowledged
that she had paid some utilities and other obligations during
the later part of 1984 and deposited all proceeds from the
Valley Twin Theatres in her account (R29.30).

When questioned

regarding the telephone calls with Winkel, Mrs. Dewsnup said
she did not recall any telephone calls, but if there was any,
it was only one (T. 96, 104). Mrs. Dewsnup testified that she
was the only one who had access to the monies being deposited
in her account from Valley Twin Cinemas (T. 104). Elizabeth
Dewsnup testified that prior to her alleged purchasing in the
fall of 1984, that she was acquainted with the manager, Brad
Whittaker; that she had become acquainted by stopping in on
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regular occasions to pick up papers or posters for Modern
Cinema.

If her other theatre was short on popcorn, she would

have Valley Twin Theatre popcorn for them, or if she ran out of
supplies, Valley Twin Theatre would provide supplies for her
other theatres (T. 108). This sharing was going on despite
Appellant's claim that Modern was the sole owner of the
Richfield theatres and Elizabeth Dewsnup was the sole owner of
the Beaver theatre (T 108, 109).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENJ
The judgment of the trial Court should be
affirmed on the grounds that there is sufficient evidence in
support of the findings of fact and that the Appellant has
failed to meet the threshold burden marshalling all evidence in
support of the findings and demonstrating that they are clearly
erroneous.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET THE THRESHOLD
REQUIREMENT OF MARSHALLING ALL EVIDENCE IN FAVOR^OF THE
FINDINGS AND SHOWING THEY ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
Rule 52a of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
sets the standard for review of civil judgments entered by the
trial Court without a jury.

This rule requires a showing by

the individual attacking the findings of fact, that the same
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are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence.

Subsequent

case law has placed the burden on the Appellant to marshal all
evidence in favor of the findings and then demonstrate that the
same are clearly erroneous in light of this evidence.

Harker

v. Condominiums Forrest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987)
In the instant case Appellant has merely
reiterated the facts as he viewed them at the trial in an
effort to support his position.

Findings of fact one through

twelve do not appear to be in dispute.

As to findings thirteen

through sixteen, the Appellant has failed to marshall any of
the supporting evidence nor has she attempted to discredit or
illustrate that it is clearly erroneous.

Instead, Appellant

has simply reiterated evidence in support of his proposed
position.
The failure of Appellant to meet this threshold
is neither elective nor optional and the trial Court1s findings
and judgment should be affirmed.

Fitzgerald v. Critchfield,

supra.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURTTS FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED
BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND ARE NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED

As previously noted, findings of fact one through
twelve of the Court have never been disputed and are supported
by the evidence.
Finding of fact number thirteen is supported by
the testimony of the manager, Brad Whittaker (T. 72, 73).
Mrs. Dewsnup also acknowledged she had paid the manager but
claimed it was merely to preserve the business until she could
take over (T. 91, 92).
As to finding of fact numbeif fourteen,
Plaintiff's manager contacted the manager of Valley Twin
Cinemas in Richfield, Utah, demanding payment for the goods
supplied.

He was told to contact the Defendant.

This finding

is supported not only by Mr. Winkel!s testimony (T. 26) but
also the testimony of Brad Whittaker, the manager (T. 65).
As to finding number fifteer^, Winkel contacted
Mrs. Dewsnup demanding payment for the goods supplied.
Mrs. Dewsnup did not dispute the claim but asked for time to
pay it since the business was short of mon|ey.

Mr. Winkel

testified unequivocally that he had discussed the Richfield
account with Mrs. Dewsnup on two or three occasions.

That on

each occasion she had acknowledged the obligation, admitted
that she was behind on her bills and promised she would make a
payment within the next few days (T. 28, 29). When questioned
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regarding these conversations, Mrs. Dewsnup stated she did not
recall any telephone conversations but if there were any, there
was only one (T. 96, 104). Later in her testimony Appellant,
Elizabeth Dewsnup, testified she never agreed to pay Modern1s
bills and attempted to rationalize the conversation described
by Winkel as merely a misunderstanding and that she thought he
was talking about the Beaver theatre when demanding payment.
As appropriately pointed out by the Court (T. 117), at the time
of the alleged conversations, the Beaver account was at most
$64.00, while the account called on by Winkel was for over
$4,000.00.

The Court clearly questioned the credibility of

Mrs. Dewsnup and found the testimony of the Plaintiff Winkel to
be more believable under the circumstances.

Finding number

fifteen is not "clearly erroneous".
Finding number sixteen of the trial Court is that
Defendant is the alter ego of Modern Cinemas Inc.

The alter

ego concept under these circumstances should be analyzed under
the principles of agency.
Elizabeth DewsnupTs relationship to the Twin
Theatres could hardly be classified as anything less than an
implied agency or agency by estoppel.

As noted in 3 Am Jur 2d

Section 18:
"The existence of an implied agency, for
example, may be inferred from prior habits
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or from a course of dealings of a similar
nature between the parties, especially where
the agent has repeatedly been permitted to
perform similar acts in the past11.
Under Section 19 of the same authority:
M

an agency by estoppel may be created
insofar as third persons are concerned . .
that is, it may arise from acts and
occurrences which lead third persons to
believe that it has been created. Agency by
estoppel may be apparent on^y and exist
because of the estoppel of tjhe principal or
agent to deny the same afteij the third party
has relied on such appearande, so that such
third party would be prejudiced if the facts
were shown to be otherwise.!1
If we review the conduct of Appellant Elizabeth
Dewsnup in relation to the Valley Twin Cinemas it becomes
patently obvious that she had more than a passing interest.
For a period of over five years she visited the theatre
frequently, either picking up papers or delivering posters
(T. 108, 109). If her theatre in Beaver ran out of supplies,
she would contact the manager at the Valley Twin Cinemas and
have them prepare popcorn, etc. (T. 109); in 1984 she began
depositing proceeds from the Valley Twin Cinemas in her account
and then chose to pay certain obligations such as payroll,
utilities and telephone payments while at the same time
choosing not to pay suppliers such as Winkel (T. 29, 30, 94,
and affidavit of Elizabeth Dewsnup).

Upon contacting the

manager of the Valley Twin Cinemas in the fall of 1984,
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Mr. Winkel was directed to Elizabeth Dewsnup as the party
responsible for obligations by the manager of the theatres
(T.26).

Upon contacting Mrs. Dewsnup on two or three

occasions, Mr. Winkel testified and the Court so found, that
she acknowledged the liability, requested more time for payment
and promised to pay (R. 39, 40). The only logical conclusion
that can be drawn from these facts is that Elizabeth Dewsnup
was acting in at least an agency capacity for the corporation
as to Winkel.
If we review the evidence in a light most
favorable to Appellant, and determine that Elizabeth Dewsnup
was, in fact, only an agent of Modern Cinema, Inc., then we
must analyze what evidence would support her liability on the
account and thus make her the

!!

alter ego!! of the principal

Modern Cinema, Inc.
As stated in 3 Am Jur 2d, Section 316:
Thus, the agent of an undisclosed
principal may be held liable on the
contract as the real obligor because he
contracted in that capacity, and an
undisclosed principal may be held liable
because as the recipient of the deal, he
should also assume its burdens.
In Section 317 of the same authority it states:
It has generally been held that the
liability of an undisclosed principal and
his agent is an alternative liability
rather than a joint liability or a joint
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and several liability, ahd that the third
party, after he becomes ^ware of the
agency and identity of t^ie principal, is
put to an election to hold either the
agent or the principal liable, but not
both.
In the instant case Winkel testified that as far
as he knew Elizabeth Dewsnup was the owner and responsible
party for the Valley Twin Cinemas (T. 55). That his basis was
that the manager had told him she was thejresponsible party and
that he had called Mrs. Dewsnup and she had acknowledged it was
her responsibility.

It should also be noted that none of the

documentation submitted by Appellant, including deposit slips
for Modern Cinema, have any designation of a corporation.

It

is undisputed in the evidence that Mrs. Dewsnup was aware in
the fall of 1984 that Modern Cinema, Inc. was having trouble
paying their bills (T. 91, 92) but despite this knowledge when
contacted by Mr. Winkel she did not refer him to any
corporation, but rather acknowledged her qwn liability and
promised payment (T. 28, 29). The result of Mrs. Dewsnup
representation was that Winkel withheld collection efforts and,
in fact, granted more credit to the Valley Twin Cinemas (T. 21,
28).

This extension of additional considejration is sufficient

to bind tiie agent for the entire obligation even if a portion
is considered as preexisting debt.
Section 308
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3 Am Jur 2d, Agency,

Under this set of facts, the Court could have
relied on undisclosed agency, estoppel or new consideration to
find Mrs. Dewsnup liable as the alter ego of Modern Cinema, Inc.
CONCLUSIONS
The judgment of the trial Court should be
affirmed,
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of June, 1988
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